17 ideas
22438 | Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine] |
22436 | Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine] |
22431 | Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine] |
22435 | The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine] |
22433 | It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine] |
22437 | Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine] |
22434 | Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
14797 | Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce] |
14798 | All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
22432 | Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine] |
22430 | If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
13713 | Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider] |