Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'Intensions Revisited' and 'The Foundations of Mathematics'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
13591 Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
13430 Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
13428 Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13427 Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
13334 Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
13426 Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
13425 Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13590 Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
8483 Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
13589 Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
13588 A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
13592 Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
22328 I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
22325 A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19087 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]