Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'Speaking of Objects' and 'Capital Vol. 1'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
"No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine]
Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Must production determine superstructure, or could it be the other way round? [Singer on Marx]
Even decently paid workers still have their produce bought with money stolen from them [Marx]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]