21 ideas
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
20643 | Consilience is a common groundwork of explanation [Whewell] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |