Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sources of the Self', 'The Quest for Certainty' and 'Value Theory'

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24 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
21516 We want certainty in order achieve secure results for action [Dewey]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
4020 The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
4002 My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
4006 I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
4003 Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
4021 Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
4005 To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
4004 Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
4010 In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
4009 Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C]