Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle', 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic' and 'Evidentialism'

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17 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
12066 Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
12067 An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12082 If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
12089 Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12102 Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19722 We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag]
19723 Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag]
19720 Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
19721 Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12085 Reality is directional [Witt]