20 ideas
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |