9 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
16771 | A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |