9 ideas
| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16771 | A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler] |
| 18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
| 18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |