Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Properties', 'works' and 'Thinking About Mechanisms'

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
5435 An interpreter of a text, because of wider knowledge, can understand it better than its author [Schleiermacher, by Mautner]
22028 Unity emerges from understanding particulars, so understanding is prior to seeing unity [Schleiermacher]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10405 In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10407 Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
10421 Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
10410 Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10416 Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
10399 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
10417 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16556 Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10402 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
10400 Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
10403 If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
10406 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16562 We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
10404 Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16563 The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
16555 Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
16561 We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
10408 Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
10409 Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
10401 The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
10420 Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
10412 If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
10411 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16558 Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]