Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Properties', 'Reply to Foucher' and 'Action'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

35 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10405 In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10407 Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
19406 I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
10421 Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
10410 Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10416 Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
10399 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
10417 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10402 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
10400 Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
10403 If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
10406 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
10404 Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
10408 Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
10409 Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
10401 The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
10420 Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
10412 If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
10411 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]