66 ideas
13030 | Extensionality: ∀x ∀y (∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y) [Kunen] |
13032 | Pairing: ∀x ∀y ∃z (x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z) [Kunen] |
13033 | Union: ∀F ∃A ∀Y ∀x (x ∈ Y ∧ Y ∈ F → x ∈ A) [Kunen] |
13037 | Infinity: ∃x (0 ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x (S(y) ∈ x) [Kunen] |
13038 | Power Set: ∀x ∃y ∀z(z ⊂ x → z ∈ y) [Kunen] |
13034 | Replacement: ∀x∈A ∃!y φ(x,y) → ∃Y ∀X∈A ∃y∈Y φ(x,y) [Kunen] |
13039 | Foundation:∀x(∃y(y∈x) → ∃y(y∈x ∧ ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y))) [Kunen] |
13036 | Choice: ∀A ∃R (R well-orders A) [Kunen] |
13029 | Set Existence: ∃x (x = x) [Kunen] |
13031 | Comprehension: ∃y ∀x (x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ φ) [Kunen] |
13040 | Constructibility: V = L (all sets are constructible) [Kunen] |
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |