Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Properties', 'Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference' and 'Summa totius logicae'

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30 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
9108 From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
9107 A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
16300 Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10405 In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10407 Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9182 Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
9106 The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
9113 Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
9110 The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
10421 Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
10410 Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10416 Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
10399 If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
10417 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10413 The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10402 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
15388 Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
10400 Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
10403 If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
9109 If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
10406 One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
10404 Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
10408 Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
10409 Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
9181 The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
10401 The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
10420 Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
9105 Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
10412 If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
10411 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]