37 ideas
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
23609 | I act justly if I follow my Prince in an apparently unjust war, and refusing to fight would be injustice [Hobbes] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |