Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining the A Priori', 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

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7 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
6343 For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
17722 The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
7534 In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]