60 ideas
| 13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
| 20981 | What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen] |
| 20982 | In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen] |
| 13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
| 10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
| 13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
| 13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
| 17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
| 17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
| 13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
| 10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
| 17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
| 13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
| 13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
| 13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
| 7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
| 13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
| 13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
| 13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
| 13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
| 13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
| 13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
| 9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
| 20990 | Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen] |
| 13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
| 13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
| 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
| 13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
| 13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
| 13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
| 13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
| 17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
| 21005 | A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen] |
| 20983 | The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen] |
| 20987 | The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen] |
| 20984 | A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen] |
| 20986 | A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen] |
| 21001 | Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen] |
| 21002 | Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen] |
| 20979 | Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen] |
| 20999 | Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen] |
| 20993 | Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen] |
| 20998 | Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen] |
| 20995 | Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen] |
| 20997 | The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen] |
| 20996 | All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen] |
| 20988 | Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen] |
| 21000 | If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen] |
| 20980 | You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen] |
| 20978 | Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen] |
| 20985 | Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen] |
| 20994 | We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen] |