52 ideas
17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
19335 | Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz] |
17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
19367 | Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz] |
19351 | Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
19331 | Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz] |
19346 | Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz] |
19340 | Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz] |
19366 | You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz] |
17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
19326 | God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz] |
19327 | The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz] |
19344 | God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz] |
19330 | If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz] |
19325 | God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz] |
19329 | The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz] |
19437 | Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz] |
19337 | How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz] |
19345 | Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz] |