85 ideas
2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |