Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Study of Concepts', 'Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology' and 'Against the Ethicists (one book)'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl]
There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet]
Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl]
Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl]
'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl]
After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl]
Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Only facts follow from facts [Husserl]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus]