20 ideas
6602 | Philosophy is like a statue which is worshipped but never advances [Bacon] |
12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
17611 | We want the essence of continuity, by showing its origin in arithmetic [Dedekind] |
10572 | A cut between rational numbers creates and defines an irrational number [Dedekind] |
17612 | Arithmetic is just the consequence of counting, which is the successor operation [Dedekind] |
18087 | If x changes by less and less, it must approach a limit [Dedekind] |
16724 | The senses deceive, but also show their own errors [Bacon] |
12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
6603 | Nature is revealed when we put it under pressure rather than observe it [Bacon] |
12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |