15 ideas
22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |