30 ideas
9821 | A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett] |
9585 | Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege] |
8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
17446 | Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege] |
9582 | Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege] |
9586 | In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege] |
9580 | Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege] |
9589 | Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege] |
9577 | The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege] |
8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
9578 | If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege] |
8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
9581 | Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
9579 | Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege] |
9587 | How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege] |
8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
9588 | Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege] |
9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |