Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining the A Priori', 'Externalism/Internalism' and 'On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura)'

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18 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz]