12 ideas
| 20349 | Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson] |
| 20351 | Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson] |
| 20350 | Metaphysics generalises the data, to get at the ontology [Richardson] |
| 17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
| 11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
| 17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
| 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
| 17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
| 20356 | Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson] |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
| 20366 | A mind that could see cause and effect as a continuum would deny cause and effect [Richardson] |