11 ideas
| 17462 | A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt] |
| 17461 | Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt] |
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
| 12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
| 12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
| 12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
| 12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
| 12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
| 12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |