8 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
14361 | Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson] |
8434 | In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
9419 | A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis] |