123 ideas
2937 | What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein] |
6870 | I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein] |
2944 | If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein] |
9810 | The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein] |
23459 | This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein] |
23512 | Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein] |
6429 | All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein] |
2938 | The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein] |
23492 | Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein] |
23510 | Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein] |
23499 | This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein] |
23508 | Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein] |
2939 | If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein] |
10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
23462 | He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
18349 | All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami] |
10967 | Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein] |
7087 | Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
4702 | The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady] |
7056 | Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein] |
23483 | Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
23502 | Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein] |
23504 | Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein] |
6428 | Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell] |
11062 | Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
18277 | If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein] |
18162 | The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
7537 | Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
23496 | Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein] |
13429 | The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey] |
18154 | The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock] |
18268 | Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein] |
10905 | My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein] |
23493 | 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein] |
7784 | 'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein] |
23506 | Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein] |
7089 | A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein] |
9467 | Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette] |
15089 | Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
13830 | Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking] |
19292 | Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein] |
18160 | The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein] |
18153 | A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein] |
18161 | The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
6849 | Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
23509 | The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
13133 | The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein] |
7090 | The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
23464 | In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein] |
23471 | The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein] |
21682 | If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein] |
21683 | Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein] |
22319 | Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein] |
23473 | Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein] |
22311 | The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein] |
22313 | The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
22314 | On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
7969 | The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein] |
7968 | A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein] |
23466 | Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein] |
23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
23468 | Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein] |
22321 | To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
6056 | Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein] |
22322 | You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein] |
6057 | Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein] |
9442 | The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein] |
23495 | The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein] |
23487 | What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein] |
23470 | Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein] |
23507 | Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM] |
23469 | An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein] |
11027 | To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein] |
23465 | The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein] |
12869 | Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein] |
6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
23503 | Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein] |
16907 | If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein] |
23479 | The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
23501 | There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein] |
7088 | Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
16909 | Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
23485 | No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein] |
6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
6591 | Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein] |
6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
17665 | The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong] |
6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
2941 | Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein] |
6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
17673 | The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein] |
6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |
2940 | The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein] |
23498 | The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein] |
23475 | The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
7084 | What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
23482 | The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein] |
8172 | To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein] |
7086 | Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein] |
23511 | Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein] |
23488 | Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein] |
23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
23497 | Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein] |
23489 | We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein] |
2943 | Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein] |
2942 | The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein] |