Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Study of Concepts', 'Ontology and Mathematical Truth' and 'On Sufficient Reason'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
19404 Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12585 Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
9967 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
9968 A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
9965 There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
9966 The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
9963 If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien]
9962 How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien]
9964 Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
9969 The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
12581 Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12579 Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
12586 Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
18568 Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
18571 Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
18572 Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12577 Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
12578 A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
12587 Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12584 An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
9335 Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
9336 A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
19403 Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz]