Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truly Understood', 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy' and 'Ontological Dependence'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]