54 ideas
9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
4913 | Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R] |
9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
4910 | Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R] |
4911 | The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG] |
4919 | There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R] |
9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
4908 | No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R] |
4902 | Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R] |
4904 | Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R] |
4915 | In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R] |
4917 | Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R] |
4916 | There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R] |
4905 | Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R] |
4918 | In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R] |
4912 | Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R] |
4903 | Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R] |
4920 | Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R] |
4906 | Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R] |
4909 | The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R] |
4914 | A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
4907 | The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R] |
9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |