16 ideas
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |