Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truly Understood', 'Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties' and 'Against the Logicians (two books)'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


16 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron]
An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]