14 ideas
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |