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All the ideas for 'Explaining the A Priori', 'Reflections on Value' and 'Analyticity Reconsidered'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23881 All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
23885 Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
23886 Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
23884 Truth is a value of thought [Weil]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
17722 The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
23882 Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23883 Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]