15 ideas
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
19690 | 'Grasping' a structure seems to be modal, because we must anticipate its behaviour [Grimm] |
19691 | Unlike knowledge, you can achieve understanding through luck [Grimm] |
19692 | You may have 'weak' understanding, if by luck you can answer a set of 'why questions' [Grimm] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |