33 ideas
| 1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
| 1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
| 2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
| 3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
| 2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
| 1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
| 19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
| 21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
| 1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
| 1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
| 1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
| 1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
| 1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
| 1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
| 1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
| 1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
| 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
| 1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
| 1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
| 1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
| 1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
| 1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
| 2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
| 2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
| 2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
| 1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
| 20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
| 2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
| 2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
| 2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
| 2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
| 22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
| 2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |