85 ideas
16325 | Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach] |
22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
16292 | An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach] |
16307 | Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach] |
16339 | Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach] |
16330 | Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach] |
16324 | Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach] |
16293 | Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach] |
16301 | If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach] |
15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
16297 | Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach] |
16337 | Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach] |
16294 | Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach] |
16311 | To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach] |
16318 | Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach] |
16326 | The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach] |
16299 | Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach] |
16340 | Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach] |
16322 | CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach] |
16305 | We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach] |
16313 | A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG] |
16315 | The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach] |
16314 | Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach] |
16327 | Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach] |
16332 | The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach] |
16329 | Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach] |
16331 | The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach] |
16338 | Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach] |
16317 | The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach] |
16316 | Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach] |
16319 | Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach] |
16320 | Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach] |
16335 | In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach] |
16334 | In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach] |
16309 | Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach] |
16333 | The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach] |
16310 | A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach] |
16341 | Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach] |
16344 | Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach] |
16342 | You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach] |
16347 | Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach] |
16336 | The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach] |
16321 | The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach] |
16343 | The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach] |
16312 | To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach] |
16308 | Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach] |
21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
16345 | That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach] |
22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
16346 | Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach] |
15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |