Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining the A Priori', 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' and 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


83 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau]
Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / b. Early medieval philosophy
The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau]
Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / c. Later medieval philosophy
Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau]
In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / d. Renaissance philosophy
Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau]
Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau]
After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau]
The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau]
Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau]
Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau]
Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau]
If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau]
Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau]
Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau]
There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau]
If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau]
A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau]
If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / b. Transubstantiation
Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau]