16 ideas
9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait] |
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait] |
9984 | We can have a series with identical members [Tait] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait] |
9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait] |
9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait] |
9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait] |
9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait] |