141 ideas
9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
22733 | Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
13291 | Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus] |
20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
22758 | Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus] |
14523 | We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
22240 | The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
1484 | We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
2670 | Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
21668 | Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
21676 | Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
1823 | We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1824 | To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5949 | Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
1821 | Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1820 | The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1822 | Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
4549 | Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus] |
2668 | Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
1482 | If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
1483 | Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
1487 | When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
14526 | The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus] |
6035 | Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius] |
1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
6018 | Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley] |
20922 | Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
14516 | There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus] |
20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1909 | How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
7814 | It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling] |
20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
3562 | Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus] |
5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1840 | Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1839 | Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1842 | Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus] |
3557 | The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas] |
20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1845 | Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus] |
5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
1841 | We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1829 | A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1843 | Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus] |
20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1831 | Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
12044 | Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas] |
21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20907 | Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
21669 | Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus] |
21680 | What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |
14525 | Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus] |
20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
2637 | For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
2633 | Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
2639 | Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
14527 | If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus] |
20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |