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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Intro to Contemporary Epistemology' and 'A Short History of Decay'

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159 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Wisdom is just the last gasp of a dying civilization [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
Intelligence only fully flourishes at the end of a historical period [Cioran]
Ideas are neutral, but people fill them with passion and weakness [Cioran]
The history of ideas (and deeds) occurs in a meaningless environment [Cioran]
Some thinkers would have been just as dynamic, no matter when they had lived [Cioran]
A nation gives expression to its sum of values, and is then exhausted [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
I abandoned philosophy because it didn't acknowledge melancholy and human weakness [Cioran]
Originality in philosophy is just the invention of terms [Cioran]
The mind is superficial, only concerned with the arrangement of events, not their significance [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a universalisation of physical anguish [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J]
Great systems of philosophy are just brilliant tautologies [Cioran]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
No great idea ever emerged from a dialogue [Cioran]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Truth is just an error insufficiently experienced [Cioran]
Eventually every 'truth' is guaranteed by the police [Cioran]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J]
If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
An axiom has no more authority than a frenzy [Cioran]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J]
Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J]
Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J]
For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J]
Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J]
Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J]
Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J]
I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J]
Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J]
Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J]
Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J]
For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J]
You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness! [Cioran]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We use concepts to master our fears; saying 'death' releases us from confronting it [Cioran]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J]
Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
At a civilisation's peak values are all that matters, and people unconsciously live by them [Cioran]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values don't accumulate; they are ruthlessly replaced [Cioran]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Lovers are hateful, apart from their hovering awareness of death [Cioran]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Man is never himself; he always aims at less than life, or more than life [Cioran]
To live authentically, we must see that philosophy is totally useless [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
The pointlessness of our motives and irrelevance of our gestures reveals our vacuity [Cioran]
Evidence suggests that humans do not have a purpose [Cioran]
The universe is dirty and fragile, as if a scandal in nothingness had produced its matter [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Unlike other creatures, mankind seems lost in nature [Cioran]
We can only live because our imagination and memory are poor [Cioran]
Life is now more dreaded than death [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
No one is brave enough to say they don't want to do anything; we despise such a view [Cioran]
You are stuck in the past if you don't know boredom [Cioran]
History is the bloody rejection of boredom [Cioran]
If you lack beliefs, boredom is your martyrdom [Cioran]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
It is pointless to refuse or accept the social order; we must endure it like the weather [Cioran]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Opportunists can save a nation, and heroes can ruin it [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The ideal is to impose a religion by force, and then live in doubt about its beliefs [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Despite endless suggestions, no one has found a goal for history [Cioran]
History is wonderfully devoid of meaning [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Religions see suicide as insubordination [Cioran]
No one has ever found a good argument against suicide [Cioran]
If you have not contemplated suicide, you are a miserable worm [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
We all need sexual secrets! [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long]
Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus]
Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Why is God so boring, and why does God resemble humanity so little? [Cioran]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
As the perfect wisdom of detachment, philosophy offers no rivals to Taoism [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
When man abandons religion, he then follows new fake gods and mythologies [Cioran]
A religion needs to motivate killings, and cannot tolerate rivals [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / e. Hell
Circles of hell are ridiculous; all that matters is to be there [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus]