17 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
10800 | The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
14596 | Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr] |
14597 | Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
14598 | Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |