Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' and 'On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius''

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes]
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman]