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All the ideas for 'works', 'Philebus' and 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation'

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49 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato]
If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon]
Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato]
Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato]
Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato]
It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato]
Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato]
The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato]
If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato]
A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman]