Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals', 'Identity over Time' and 'Russell'

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24 ideas

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
6408 Russell needed three extra axioms to reduce maths to logic: infinity, choice and reducibility [Grayling]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
22427 To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16025 If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
16026 4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16027 If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
6414 Two propositions might seem self-evident, but contradict one another [Grayling]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
22413 Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
22415 Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
22416 Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
22422 Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
22428 You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
22414 You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
22423 Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
22426 We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
22412 Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
22421 Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
22424 Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
22425 The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
7629 We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
22420 The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
18410 Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
22417 Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
18402 Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
22418 I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]