Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Structure of Content', 'Deflating Existential Consequence' and 'Elusive Knowledge'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

18 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
12442 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
12439 Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
12437 Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
12446 Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
12447 That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
12445 If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12449 Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12440 If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
12438 In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
12441 We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
12448 Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
12899 The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
6171 Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
12897 To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
12898 Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
12895 Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
19562 We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
12450 The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni]