66 ideas
| 12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
| 6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
| 6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
| 6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
| 6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
| 6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
| 6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
| 6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
| 6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
| 12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
| 6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
| 6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
| 6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
| 6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
| 6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
| 6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
| 6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
| 12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
| 6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
| 6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
| 6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
| 12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
| 12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
| 6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
| 6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
| 12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
| 12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
| 12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
| 12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
| 12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
| 12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
| 23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
| 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| 12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
| 12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
| 6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
| 6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
| 6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
| 6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
| 6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
| 6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
| 6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
| 6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
| 6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
| 6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
| 6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
| 6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
| 12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
| 12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
| 6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
| 6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
| 6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
| 6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
| 12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
| 6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
| 6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
| 3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |
| 12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
| 12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
| 12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
| 12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
| 12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
| 12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
| 12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
| 6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
| 6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |