37 ideas
2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
15169 | Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle] |
15164 | We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle] |
2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
15180 | There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle] |
15184 | Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle] |
15172 | Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle] |
15181 | Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle] |
15173 | That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle] |
15185 | We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle] |
15175 | Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle] |
15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
15171 | The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle] |
15167 | Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle] |
15177 | Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle] |
15176 | The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle] |
15174 | A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle] |
15183 | 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle] |
15165 | A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle] |
2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
15168 | That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle] |
15166 | Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle] |
15182 | Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle] |
2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
22717 | Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone] |
22718 | Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone] |
22719 | The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone] |
22720 | Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone] |
22721 | The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone] |
22722 | TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone] |
22723 | Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone] |
2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
15178 | Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle] |