Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Sayings of Confucius', 'Causation' and 'To be is to be the value of a variable..'

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34 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
People who control others with fluent language often end up being hated [Kongzi (Confucius)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
All men prefer outward appearance to true excellence [Kongzi (Confucius)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Humans are similar, but social conventions drive us apart (sages and idiots being the exceptions) [Kongzi (Confucius)]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself [Kongzi (Confucius)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Excess and deficiency are equally at fault [Kongzi (Confucius)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The virtues of the best people are humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness [Kongzi (Confucius)]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely [Kongzi (Confucius)]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Confucianism assumes that all good developments have happened, and there is only one Way [Norden on Kongzi (Confucius)]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]