44 ideas
| 11064 | Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna] |
| 10373 | Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J] |
| 6407 | The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 10418 | Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell] |
| 10047 | Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave] |
| 23478 | Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell] |
| 21718 | Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 18126 | A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 18128 | Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 18124 | Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 10367 | There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J] |
| 7357 | People who control others with fluent language often end up being hated [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
| 7358 | All men prefer outward appearance to true excellence [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
| 7362 | Humans are similar, but social conventions drive us apart (sages and idiots being the exceptions) [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
| 7360 | Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
| 7359 | Excess and deficiency are equally at fault [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
| 7363 | The virtues of the best people are humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
| 7361 | Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely [Kongzi (Confucius)] |
| 23393 | Confucianism assumes that all good developments have happened, and there is only one Way [Norden on Kongzi (Confucius)] |
| 10359 | In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J] |
| 10372 | Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J] |
| 10374 | There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J] |
| 10366 | Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J] |
| 10377 | Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J] |
| 10378 | A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J] |
| 10382 | Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10375 | At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J] |
| 10389 | Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J] |
| 10390 | Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J] |
| 10380 | Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J] |
| 10385 | If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10387 | The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J] |
| 10388 | Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J] |
| 10384 | If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10386 | If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J] |
| 10361 | Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J] |
| 10360 | Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J] |
| 10362 | One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J] |
| 10368 | If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J] |
| 10383 | The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J] |
| 10393 | Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J] |
| 10394 | Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J] |
| 10376 | The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J] |
| 10381 | All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J] |