54 ideas
1502 | Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides] |
18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
448 | No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides] |
447 | Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides] |
449 | Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides] |
1503 | There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides] |
445 | The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides] |
21820 | Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus] |
452 | All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
1504 | Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
444 | The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides] |
450 | Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
451 | Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides] |
1506 | Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides] |
3058 | Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
555 | People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
5081 | There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
1509 | The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius] |
20900 | Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle] |
1505 | Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
453 | Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides] |
226 | The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides] |
1792 | He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |
5115 | It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides] |
13217 | The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle] |
22918 | What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides] |
1791 | He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |
1794 | He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius] |